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AMERICAN HEALTH BENEFIT
EXCHANGES: STATE REGULATORS
MUST ENCOURAGE PRIVATE
MARKET PARTICIPATION
ELIZABETH BAYLY*
On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed into law the most sweeping
federal health care reform since the enactment of Medicare in 1965.1 As its name
implies, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act2 ("PPACA") seeks to
ensure enhanced access and affordable health insurance for all United States
citizens.3 In order to reach this goal, the PPACA's approach is to preserve the
country's primarily private insurance based health coverage system, and to increase
participation through the implementation of various reforms.4 Two key provisions
of the PPACA, the requirement that states develop and maintain health benefit
exchanges (the "exchange")5 and the requirement that health insurers use at least
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* J.D. Candidate, 2012, University of Maryland Francis King Cary School of Law (Baltimore, MD);
M.B.A. Candidate, 2012, University of Baltimore Merrick School of Business (Baltimore, MD); B.B.A.,
2007, Finance, The College of William and Mary (Williamsburg, VA). The author wishes to thank
Professor Stephen Carney for his patience and guidance in developing this Comment. The author also
appreciatively acknowledges the staff of the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy for their support.
1. Press Release, Sebelius Remarks: Health Reform and You: How the New Law Will Increase
Your Health Security, Department of Health & Human Services (April 6, 2010),
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2010pres/04/20100406b.html; see also Medicare: A Timeline of Key
Developments, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://www.kff.org/medicare/medicaretimeline.cfm
(last visited Feb. 27, 2012) (explaining that between 1965 and 2006, the program covered over forty-two
million people).
2. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of21, 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). The PPACA, as used in this
article, also includes amendments made to it by the Health Care and Education Reform Act of 2010,
Pub. L. I11-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).
3. Amy Goldstein, Priority One: Expanding Coverage, in LANDMARK: THE INSIDE STORY OF
AMERICA'S NEW HEALTH-CARE LAW AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR US ALL 73 (2010).
4. See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1312, 42 U.S.C.S. § 18032 (LexisNexis
Supp. 2011) (requiring "consumer choice" and defining a qualified individual, establishing risk pools,
and emphasizing the "voluntary nature of the exchanges").
5. Id. § 18031(b)(1). The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act requires each state, by 2014,
to "establish an American Health Benefit Exchange . . . that facilitates the purchase of qualified health
plans." Id. § 18031(b)(1)(A).
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eighty percent of the premiums collected to pay for claims, 6 are designed to provide
consumers with insurer transparency, more choices and to ensure fair insurance
pricing.7 The PPACA, through the Secretary of Health and Human Services
("HHS") and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners ("NAIC"), lays
the groundwork for the exchanges' but leaves the details to states and states'
current insurance regulation systems.9 It is critical that these reforms be
implemented in a fashion that takes into consideration the economic realities of our
current health care system and the private health insurance market. Failure to do so
is likely to result in increased insurer insolvencies and potentially, the failure of the
PPACA's approach to health care reform.
This paper argues that to accomplish the PPACA's goals, federal and state
regulators must work together with the private insurance industry to develop
regulations and state legislation that will implement the mandates of the PPACA,
encourage participation, and promote the efficient operation of the private
insurance market. Part I outlines the basic economics of any insurance market and
explains how insurers profit. Part II explores the history of health insurance and
how the United States has become one of the few countries that operates health
insurance through a largely market based system. Io Part III goes on to explain the
current health care market system and explains the creation and function of the
exchanges as they are outlined in the PPACA. Part IV evaluates the business
implications that the exchanges will have on the current health care industry
through risk selection, premium rating, and premium adjustment and the medical
loss ratio.
I. THE ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE
In general, insurance attempts to quantify the abstract concept of risk by
weighing an individual's probability of experiencing future loss and the extent of
that loss with the individual's ability to absorb that loss." Individuals exchange
constant small payments equal to the insured's expected loss, called the insurance
6. Id § 300gg-18(b)(1)(A)(ii). The threshold for employer based plans is eighty percent, but
individual and small employer plans must pay eighty-five percent of premiums towards medical claims.
Id. § 300gg-18(b)(1)(A)(i).
7. AMERICAN HEALTH BENEFIT EXCHANGE MODEL ACT, § 2 (Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs, Draft
2010).
8. 42 U.S.C.S. § 18041(a) (requiring the Secretary to consult with the NAIC and other interested
parties in developing exchange regulations).
9. Id. § 18041(b).
10. See T. R. Reid, Myths About Health Care Around the World, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 2009, at
B03 (outlining basic health insurance models, including, Great Britain's National Healthcare Service, a
national system financed by the federal government through taxes; Germany's system that is much like
the United States'; and Canada's national health insurance system, run by the government but
implemented by the private sector).
I1. ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 10(c)(1)
(LexisNexis 4 ed. 2007).
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premium, for the insurer's promise to cover the risk of larger losses resulting from
future events.12 Insurers, however, are not inclined to cover all possible risk of an
individual's future loss because of the possibility of moral hazard.' 3 Moral hazard
is an unintended consequence of insurance that occurs when an individual is more
inclined to participate in riskier activities or take fewer precautionary measures
because he knows he has insurance coverage.14 This phenomenon actually
increases the probability of loss to the insurer.' 5 To avoid moral hazard, an insurer
will leave some responsibility on the individual by either adjusting premiums based
on individual activities or by charging a deductible,16 coinsurance,' 7 or
copayments.' t Though these tactics do not completely prevent moral hazard, they
do help counter the insurer's loss.19
An insurer's probability of loss decreases as the insurer increases the number
of individuals in the group it insurers. 20 It would be impossible and very inefficient
for an insurer to calculate each individual's expected loss. 2 1 Instead, an insurer
attempts to pool similarly situated individuals into risk pools in order to spread risk
of loss evenly. 22 Insurers use underwriting to place individuals in the appropriate
risk pool. 23 Underwriting uses various factors affecting an individual's health
status, such as health history, to determine whether the insurer will accept an
12. Id. § 10(c)(1)-(c)(2).
13. Id.
14. Id
15. Id.
16. Id. § 10(c)(2). A plan's deductible determines how much an individual must pay before any
insurance benefits kick in. Id. Typically, a higher deductible will mean a lower premium because an
individual will be paying more out of pocket before insurance coverage begins. Id.
17. Id. Coinsurance is the ratio at which the individual and the insurer split costs beyond the
deductible. Id.
18. See NAT'L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS ET AL., JOINT STATEMENT ON MEDICATION COST
SHARING IN STATE MEDICAID PROGRAMS 1 (2008), available at
http://www.nami.org/Template.cfm?Section=Access-toMedications&Template=/ContentManagement/
ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=62472 (defining copayments as cost sharing devises that shift financial
burden to the patient).
19. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note I1, § 10(c)(2).
20. Id. § 10(c)(1). The following hypothetical is modeled after a similar example provided by Jerry
and Richmond: X has a one-in-100 chance of suffering a loss of $1000 and is willing to pay insurer Y
$15 (his premium) to assume that loss. If Y groups 99 other people like X and charges each of them $15,
Y will collect $1500. If each of the insured has a one in 100 chance of loss, one of them will probably
suffer a loss and Y anticipates paying $1000. Y eams a profit of $500 and each X is covered in case he
is the one who suffers. Id.
21. Id. § 10(c)(2).
22. Id.
23. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HOW PRIVATE HEALTH COVERAGE WORKS: A PRIMER 2008
UPDATE 5-6 (2008) [hereinafter A PRIMER 2008 UPDATE] ("Underwriting is the process of determining
whether or not to accept an applicant for coverage and determining what the terms of coverage will be,
including the premium.").
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individual for coverage.2 4 Forming these pools, however, can result in the negative
economic effect of adverse selection. 25 When a group of similarly situated people
are in a group insured at the same premium, some people will always be better risks
for the insurance provider than others.2 6 When less risky individuals realize that
they are paying too high a premium due to the more risky individuals within their
pool, the less risky will leave the pool altogether.27 Insurers will adjust factors such
as premiums and scope of coverage28 in an attempt to avoid insuring too many high
risk, high cost people.29
Economically, both parties that enter into an insurance contract should be
better off than before. 30 Individuals are able to transfer risk of loss to someone else
and avoid facing large future payments, and the insurer makes a reasonable return
by assuming risk from statistically profitable groups of individuals. 3'
1I. A HISTORY AND OVERVIEW OF THE PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET IN
THE UNITED STATES
Health insurance is a relatively recent phenomenon that began much
differently than it exists today. 32 The earliest forms of insurance coverage focused
on lost income resulting from accidents or sickness instead of covering particular
health services.33 Traditional insurers were reluctant to offer more comprehensive
24. Id. For instance, medical underwriting considers "age, family history, lifestyle, and current
health." U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK
HANDBOOK 106 (2010). Applications for coverage typically include questions about these factors. Id.
25. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note I1, § 10(c)(2).
26. Id. For a simplistic example: A and B are insured drivers grouped in a pool as females, under
thirty, living in the suburbs. A tends to drive much faster than B and has accrued five speeding tickets in
the past year. This particular insurer does not consider speeding tickets for placing A and B in their risk
pool, and charges both A and B the same average premium. A, however, is a much higher risk than B.
27. GARY CLAXTON, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., How PRIVATE HEALTH COVERAGE
WORKS: A PRIMER 4 (2002). In the example above, when B realizes that her risk of loss is only about
$500 and she is paying $1,000 in annual premium to cover A's risk for the insurer, B will likely drop the
insurance and take her chances.
28. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note I1, § 10(c)(2).
29. See CLAXTON, supra note 27, at 5 (defining underwriting as a preemptive process that insurers
use to evaluate individuals for acceptance, coverage, terms, and premium based on the individuals'
varied risk within a risk pool).
30. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note I1, §-10(c)(2).
31. See id (outlining a hypothetical situation where X transfers risk to Y in exchange for payments
so that Y ultimately makes a profit).
32. Eleanor D. Kinney, For Profit Enterprise in Health Care: Can it Contribute to Health Reform?,
36 AM. J.L. & MED. 405, 407 (2010).
33. Laura A. Scofea, The Development and Growth of Employer-Provided Health Insurance,
MONTHLY LAB. REv., Mar. 1994, at 3, 3. In 1798, Congress established the earliest coverage for health
services in the United States. Id. The U.S. Marine Hospital services made deductions for hospital
services from seamen's salaries. Id. Franklin Health Assurance Company of Massachusetts wrote the
first accident policy in 1850 that paid the insured $200 in case of bodily injury resulting from a railway
or steamboat accident, for a 15-cent premium. Id. In the late 1800s, Aetna Life Insurance Company and
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health insurance because the losses associated with medical insurance were
extremely hard to predict. 34 Additionally, prior to 1920, the general public did not
believe actual health insurance was necessary.35 Shortly after World War 1, demand
for medical care and medical costs began to rise. 36 During this time the general
population began to concentrate in urban areas,37 the public began to accept
medicine as a science, 38 and there was hospital growth and increased wealth.39 As
demand quickly grew, so did the cost of health services. 40 At this time, the
American Medical Association ("AMA") developed stringent standards for doctor
licensing and education making it more difficult and expensive for doctors to enter
the field, essentially limiting the supply of doctors.41 With fewer doctors to provide
service coupled with stable demand for those services, the price of medical services
increased.42 Simultaneously, the financial strains of the Great Depression meant
that few people were able to afford the rising cost of hospital care and hospitals
were steadily losing income.43 In 1929 consequently, a group of Dallas teachers
contracted with a hospital to provide certain services for a fixed annual payment.44
This was the beginning of prepaid hospital services that were popular throughout
the 1930s. 45 These single hospital plans, however, increased competition among
hospitals and threatened individual hospital solvency. 46 In response, community
Travelers Insurance Company began offering insurance coverage to protect against "loss due to
temporary total disability occasioned by all diseases except tuberculosis, venereal disease, insanity, or
disabilities due to alcohol or narcotics." Id. at 4. In 1910 Montgomery Ward established the first group
health insurance policy for its employees, contracting with the London Guarantee and Accident Co. in
New York to provide one-half the employee's salary if he was unable to work due to illness or injury.
Id.
34. Melissa Thomasson, Health Insurance in the United States, ECON. HISTORY ASS'N. (Feb. 01,
2010 18:21), http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/thomasson.insurance.health.us.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.; John Preskitt, Health Care Reimbursement: Clements to Clinton, 21 BAYLOR U. MED.
CENTER PROC. 40, 40 (2008). Families that once had room for sick family members in their rural homes,
no longer had extra space in their new urban homes. Id.
38. Thomasson, supra note 34. The sick began visiting hospitals for treatment. Id.
39. See id. (describing health insurance as a "normal good" so that income and demand rise
simultaneously).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Joseph Ross, The Committee on the Costs of Medical Care and the History of Health Insurance
in the United States, 19 EINSTEIN Q. J. BIOLOGY MED. 129, 129-130 (2002).
43. Scofea, supra note 33, at 5.
44. Id.; Preskitt, supra note 37, at 41.
45. Thomasson, supra note 34. These prepaid contracts were advantageous to both the consumers
and the hospitals. The consumers were able to cover their risk and affordably pay for hospital care. Id.
The hospitals were earning steady income even if their beds were not full. Id.
46. Id.
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hospitals organized together and this structure became known as Blue Cross. 47 Blue
Cross operated as a not for profit organization and private insures remained
reluctant to enter the health insurance market.
By the 1940s, private insurers realized that they could avoid adverse selection
by offering health plans to groups of employed workers. 48 This group's
demographic was less risky because it was composed in large part of young,
healthy, low-risk people who did not seek insurance on their own. 49 This tactic
proved to be profitable and private insurers held a competitive pricing advantage
over Blue Cross.50 When wages froze during World War II, employers even began
to pay portions of their employee's health insurance premiums to entice workers
through benefits packages.5' By 1958, private health insurers insured about
seventy-five percent of the American population. 52
Employer based health insurance continues to dominate the private health
insurance market.53 In 2009, about 170 million Americans were insured through
their employers. 54 Through employer provided insurance, "employers subsidize the
cost of insurance" as part of the employee's compensation benefits. 55  The
employee bears a portion of the cost through premiums, out of pocket expenses,
copayments, deductibles, and coverage scope. 56 Even though most companies do
47. Id. While hospitals faced particular guidelines as part of the Blue Cross group, they also
enjoyed benefits from being a member, including not-for-profit status, tax exemption, and freedom from
the normal insurance regulation. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. See Jon Kingsdale & John Bertko, Insurance Exchanges Under Health Re/orm: Six Design
Issues for the States, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1158, 1159 (2010) (contrasting community rating and individual
rating). Community rating uses a community's overall demographics to determine a group's risk and
insurers use this rating to charge everyone the same premium. Id. A community rating system requires
the insurer to charge the same premium to everyone. Thomasson, supra note 34. In contrast, the private
insurers could offer experience ratings that gave healthy people lower premiums. Id. Experience rating
allows an insurer to evaluate each individual's health risk based on factors such as his health history in
order to determine individual premium pricing. Kingsdale & Bertko, supra, at 1159.
51. See Scofea, supra note 33, at 6 (describing a Congressional act that froze wages but allowed
employers to offer insurance plans which resulted in a growth of insurance plans). Employers also
received a tax break on the money spent for employee premiums. Thomasson, supra note 34.
52. Thomasson, supra note 34.
53. See Health Insurance and State: NCSL Overview, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/?Tabld=14509 (last updated Sept. 2011) (providing that 55.3% of
people were covered by employment-based health insurance in 2010 and 31% of people were covered
by government health insurance).
54. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY: TABLE HIM0. HEALTH INSURANCE
COVERAGE STATUS AND TYPE OF COVERAGE BY SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS (2009).
55. Andrew Villegas, Employer-Based Insurance Explained, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 28,
2009), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2009/September/28/NPR-employer-explainer.aspx.
56. Id.
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not provide workers with individual insurance plan options,57 employer sponsored
group policies tend to be significantly cheaper than individual policies.58
For individuals not covered by employer insurance, and small businesses that
do not provide employer sponsored healthcare coverage, the market is slightly
different. 59 Prior to the PPACA's passage, insurers used underwriting to evaluate
an individual's risk and then adjust policy costs accordingly. 60 Insurers would
group an individual with other similarly situated individuals and put the group into
a "pool" in order to spread risk and create expected costs for the pool that were
relatively predictable and stable over time. 61 Insurers would adjust an individual's
coverage, premium, deductibles, and copayments in order to balance the risk
pool. 62 To avoid adverse selection, insurers had to anticipate differences in future
costs among individuals in the risk pool. 63 In order to do so, health insurers used
tactics such as underwriting, rescission or policy cancellation, and instituting
lifetime maximums. 64 Insurers then priced premiums accordingly.
For the health insurance provider, premiums are liquid assets and these assets
are balanced with reserves and a surplus on the balance sheet.65 The reserves reflect
anticipated claims payments and expenses, and insurers are required to maintain a
surplus in case expense predictions are too low. 66 In a given year, the ratio of
premiums spent on claim payments to total premiums collected is the medical loss
ratio ("MLR").67 Premium dollars spent on expenses other than claims payments
57. Id.
58. Compare HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., SURVEY OF PEOPLE WHO PURCHASE THEIR OWN
INSURANCE 4 (June 2010), http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/8077-R.pdf (finding that individuals in
2010 paid an average of $3,606 for health insurance), with HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. ET AL.,
EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS 1 (2010), http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/2010/8085.pdf (finding that the average
individual contribution to an employer sponsored health plan in 2010 was $899).
59. See PETER HARBAGE, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS ACTION FUND, THE INEFFICIENT INDIVIDUAL
MARKET I (Mar. 23, 2009), http://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/2009/03/pdf/
administrative costs.pdf (determining that one of the main reasons that the individual insurance market
is expensive is due to underwriting).
60. A PRIMER 2008 UPDATE, supra note 23, at 6.
61. Id. For an explanation of the underwriting, see supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
62. Id at 5-7. See SARAH LUECK, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, STATES SHOULD
TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS TO LIMIT ADVERSE SELECTION AMONG HEALTH PLANS IN AN EXCHANGE 2
(2011) (suggesting that plans must set deductible and copayment amounts in ways to avoid adverse
selection).
63. Id. at 6.
64. Troyen A. Brennan & David M Studdert, How Will Health Insurers Respond to New Rules
Under Health Reform?, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1147, 1148 (2010). Lifetime limits determine the maximum
dollar value of benefits an insurer will pay during an insured's lifetime. See Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act § 2711, 42 U.S.C.S. § 300gg- II (LexisNexis Supp. 2011).
65. MASS. Div. OF HEALTH CARE FINANCE & POLICY, STUDY OF THE RESERVES AND SURPLUSES
OF HEALTH INSURERS IN MASSACHUSETTS 1-2(2010).
66. Id.
67. Len M. Nichols, Implementing Insurance Market Reforms Under the Federal Health Reform
Law, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1152, I153 (2010).
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include operating costs, marketing, and profits that go to surplus and investors. 68
Some states regulate the MLR, setting limits on the amount of premium dollars
spent on administrative costs. 69 Regulation discourages insurers from charging
unfair premiums and garnering excess profits while ensuring insurers' solvency. 70
If the MLR is set too high, an insurer will not have the capital available to run
administrative operations efficiently, if at all, and will choose to leave the market.7 '
If the MLR is set too low, insurers will maintain excess premiums and keep
additional capital for profits. 72 An appropriately regulated MLR strikes a balance
between the two, encouraging market efficiency.73 Effective MLR regulation also
depends on the insurer's business model. 74
Today's health insurers include both for-profit and not-for-profit companies.75
In either model, the company must collect at least enough in premiums to remain
solvent.76 In a for-profit insurance model, the company must not only maintain
operating levels, but also show investors a suitable return. As medical costs rise and
68. Id.
69. Id at 1154.
70. Compare John Carroll, Plans Scramble to Defend Their Medical Loss Ratios, MANAGED CARE
(Jan. 2010), http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/1001/1001 .regulation.html (discussing
Democrat complaints that publicly traded insurers tout profits and relatively low MLRs on Wall Street
so regulation is necessary to prevent the "elaborate sham"), with Letter from the Nat'l Ass'n of Ins.
Comm'rs to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't. Health & Human Servs. (Oct. 27, 2010) (expressing
concerns that an MLR that is too strictly regulated could result in destabilized markets and undermine
insurer solvency).
71. MARK LABORDE, AETNA JACKSON/TAMPA MKTS., COMMENTS OF AETNA INC. BEFORE THE
JOINT PUBLIC HEARING OF THE FLORIDA OFFICE OF INSURANCE REGULATION & THE FLORIDA HEALTH
INSURANCE ADVISORY BOARD 7 (May 4, 2010).
72. See Medical Loss Ratio: Getting Your Money's Worth on Health Insurance, HEALTHCARE.GOV,
http://www.healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/medical lossratio.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2011)
(discussing how today's insurers spend a substantial part of premiums on costs such as profits and
salaries) [hereinafter Getting Your Money's Worth]; see also James C. Robinson, Use and Abuse of the
Medical Loss Ratio to Measure Health Plan Perornance, HEALTH AFF., July-Aug. 1997, at 176, 179
(explaining that traditionally, some state regulators only allowed insurers to raise premiums if medical
costs forced the medical loss ratio higher than the target in an effort to prevent insurers from raising
premiums at a higher rate than medical expenses).
73. See Getting Your Money's Worth, supra note 72 (describing NAIC's involvement in
determining MLR regulation and the HHS Secretary's ability to adjust the medical loss ratio in order to
keep the state market stabilized and provide an effective market transition).
74. See Jennifer Haberkom, Medical Loss Ratios. Health Insurers Will Soon be Required to Spend
a Specific Share ofthe Premiums They Collect on Health Care for Policyholders, HEALTH POL'Y BRIEF
(Health Affairs, Bethesda, MD), Nov. 24, 2010, at 2 (comparing Medicare, a government run program
that maintains a ninety-seven to ninety-eight percent MLR with large health insurers who in 2009 had
medical loss ratios between sixty-eight to eighty-eight percent).
75. See, e.g., About Kaiser Permanente, KAISER PERMANENTE,
http://xnet.kp.org/newscenter/aboutkp/fastfacts.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2011) ("Kaiser Permanente is
one of the nation's largest not-for-profit health plans."); Investor Information, AETNA,
http://www.aetna.com/investors-aetna/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2012) (providing information for
the company's investors, including annual reports and proxy statements).
76. LABORDE, supra note 71, at 7.
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insurance companies strive to remain profitable, premiums will dramatically
increase.77
III. THE EXCHANGES
One way that the PPACA seeks to reform the current health care industry is
by requiring states to develop exchanges.78 The exchanges will function as a state
created insurance marketplace for qualified individuals and employers to compare
and purchase affordable health insurance.79 According to the U.S. Census Bureau,
in 2009, of the approximate 304 million people in the United States, 16.65% had no
form of health insurance.80 One reason for this is because employer based
insurance is the most common way Americans get health coverage. The number
of uninsured has risen significantly in the past two years due to the recession and
weak job market that pushed more Americans from the large employer market to
the individual health insurance market. 82
The individual segment of the potential health insurance market is dominated
by the "young invincibles" 83 with about one third of people age twenty to twenty-
nine foregoing health insurance. 84 The uninsured population also includes those
individuals that private providers reject because of pre-existing conditions or some
other disproportionately large risk factor.s The rest of the individual insurance
market, then is saturated with older, less healthy people that cost providers more to
insure. 86 The Exchanges target this individual segment of the market.87
77. See Tom Kisken, Medical Costs Driven by Unhealthy Lifestyles, Says Insurance Executive,
M.VCSTAR.COM, http://www.vestar.com/news/201 l/apr/14/medical-costs-driven-by-unhealthy-
lifestyles/ (last updated April 14, 2011) (noting that rising medical costs increases insurance premiums);
HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2011 ANNUAL SURVEY 10-11
(2011), http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/2011/8225.pdf (outlining the large premium increases among insured
groups between 2010 and 2011).
78. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1311, 42 U.S.C.S. § 1803 1(b) (LexisNexis Supp.
2011).
79. Goldstein, supra note 3, at 76.
80. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 54.
81. Villegas, supra note 55.
82. Robert Wood Johnson Found., Impact of the Economy on Health Care, PPACADEMYHEALTH
1-2 (Aug. 2009), http://www.PPACAdemyhealth.org/files/HCFO/findings0809.pdf. From 2007-2009,
the number of uninsured rose by about 5 million. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE UNINSURED
AND THE DIFFERENCE HEALTH INSURANCE MAKES I (Sept. 2010),
http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/1420-12.pdf.
83. Term coined for the group of individuals younger than thirty who believe that they can do
without broad insurance coverage. Alec MacGillis, The Individual Mandate: How It Will Work, in
LANDMARK: THE INSIDE STORY OF AMERICA'S NEW HEALTH-CARE LAW AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR US
ALL 86 (2010).
84. Id. at 87.
85. Id. at 93.
86. Id. at 87.
87. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1311, 42 U.S.C.S. § 18031(b) (LexisNexis
Supp. 2011) (limiting exchanges to qualified individuals and small employers).
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The market within the exchanges will only include individuals and small
employers. Additionally, most individuals will qualify for subsidies to purchase
insurance in the exchange."8 A small employer qualifies for participation in the
exchanges if during the calendar year, the employer has an average of at least one
but no more than one hundred employees. 89 The exchanges will create larger pools
for individuals and small-employer groups in order to spread risk among the
members of these groups, creating a residual market.90 In theory, these exchanges
will create the type of risk pools that large businesses inherently create.9' The
health plans offered in these exchanges must be "qualified health plans" as defined
by the PPACA and the Secretary of HHS. 92 Qualified health plans are placed into
one of four levels of coverage: platinum, gold, silver, or bronze.93 For small
employer groups, the employer chooses the level offered, and the employee may
88. Goldstein, supra note 3, at 79.
89. 42 U.S.C.S. §18024(b)(2). Individual states may decide whether the employee limit should be
50 or 100. Id.§18024(b)(3).
90. Because there is such a large number of individuals that either choose not have health insurance
or are rejected by the private market, the current state of the health insurance system provides an
environment for creating a residual health insurance market. ToM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND
POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 693 (2nd ed. 2008). Residual markets are legislatively created
marketplaces designed to provide insurance for people who are unable to purchase insurance in the open
market. Id. at 693. In other segments of insurance, states have created residual markets for those who
can not be insured by the private market either because they can not afford it or because the private
market rejects them. Id at 694. For instance, all states have created residual markets for automobile
insurance. Id. in most states it is a law that to be eligible to drive, one must carry auto insurance. Id.
For those that cannot afford insurance, or have such a bad driving history that they can not be approved
for insurance, most states have created a residual market, where these high risk individuals can obtain
insurance. Id. In order to allow these individuals to still participate in the system, states require
insurance providers to contribute to a pool that provides these risky individuals with the minimum
coverage. Id. By doing so, the states are balancing the importance of the economic goals of insurers'
solvency with the social goal of providing access to the insurance to all individuals. Id. In essence, the
state run exchanges will act as residual health insurance markets for those Americans currently
uninsured. Id.
91. See AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, CRITICAL ISSUES IN HEALTH REFORM: RISK POOLING 1 (2009)
(describing the concept of risk pooling and contrasting employer based risk pooling and risk pooling in
the individual market).
92. 42 U.S.C.S. § 18021.
93. Id. § 18022(d)(1). These levels of coverage must have actuarial values of ninety percent, eighty
percent, seventy percent, and sixty percent respectively. Id. An actuarial value estimates the average
percentage that the plan will pay in expenses based on the cost sharing provisions of the plan.
CONSUMERS UNION, WHAT WILL AN "ACTUARIAL VALUE" STANDARD MEAN FOR CONSUMERS? I
(2011), http://prescriptionforchange.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/20 11/01/consumers union-
health policybrief-201 1_01-what will an actuarial value standard mean for consumers.pdf. The
value is based on a standard population, however, so each individual will not actually get that amount of
coverage. Id. at 3. In fact, actuarial value systems are designed so that lower risk individuals will end up
paying a larger share of expenses. Id.
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choose a plan offered within that level. 94 Specific health plans will differ within
different state exchanges.95
The Secretary of HHS will provide grant money to states to develop the
exchanges. 96 On February 16, 2011, HHS named seven states, "Kansas, Maryland,
New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, and a consortium of New England states," that will
share $241 million in "early innovator" grants.97 These grants are specifically
tailored toward helping these states create the information technology infrastructure
required for implementing the exchanges.98 The states will also determine whether
the exchanges operate as a government agency or a non profit entity established by
the state.99 Small states will have one exchange, large states may have more than
one exchange (subsidiaries in geographically distinct areas), or separate states may
agree to interstate exchanges. 00 The structure of the exchange must be in place by
January 1, 2014.101 If a state opts out of creating its own exchange, the Secretary
may step in and establish an exchange in the state. 102 Some states, such as
Maryland, immediately began drafting legislation for individual state exchanges,10 3
while others, like Alaska and Minnesota, adamantly refused to participate or apply
for federal grants.'0
The exchanges have basic functions outlined in the PPACA to promote
clarity, including: certify plans, provide toll free phone and website for consumers,
create a plan rating system, and establish a standard presentation format. 105 In order
to promote transparency within the exchanges themselves, the PPACA requires
exchanges to keep accounting, publish their own costs, and allows the HHS to
investigate exchanges and conduct annual audits.106 Exchanges must work with
interested parties including consumers, individuals experienced in facilitating
94. 42 U.S.C.S. § 18032(a).
95. See id. § 1803 1(d)(3)(B)(i) (describing a qualified health plan as one that adheres to regulations
adopted by the Secretary as well as those created by the state exchanges).
96. Id. § 1803 1(a).
97. Dena Bunis, 'Exchange Innovator' States Get $241 Million in Grants, CQ HEALTHBEAT
(Congressional Quarterly, D.C.) Feb. 16, 2011, at 1, http://www.cq.com/doc/hbnews-3814328.
98. Id.
99. 42 U.S.C.S. § 1803 1(d)(1).
100. Id. § 18031(f).
101. Id. § 18031(b)(1).
102. Id. § 18041(c).
103. See H.D. 166, S. 182, 2011 Leg., 428th Sess. (Md. 2011) (proposing the Maryland Health
Benefit Exchange Act). On April 12, 2011, Maryland Governor Martin O'Malley signed the Maryland
Health Benefit Exchange Act, creating a foundation for Maryland exchanges. The Maryland Health
Benefit Exchange, MD. DEP'T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE,
http://www.dhmh.maryland.gov/healthreform/exchange/SitePages/Home.aspx (last visited Feb. 28,
2012).
104. Katie Pickert, Health Reform: Reluctant States Could Invite a Federal Takeover, TIME (Nov.
12, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2030932,00.html.
105. 42 U.S.C.S. § 18031(d)(4).
106. Id. §§ 18031(d)(7), 18033(a)(l)-(3).
2012] 207
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY
health plans, representatives of small businesses and the self employed, state
Medicaid, and advocates for enrolling those in hard to reach areas.107
Beyond the exchanges, the PPACA makes changes to the insurance market in
general. The PPACA requires insurers to create a single risk pool composed of
enrollees in all health plans offered to the individual and small group markets
respectively, including those who do not enroll through the exchange. 08 Medical
underwriting is eliminated, along with rescission, cancellation, lifetime limits,
screening for pre-existing conditions, and other discriminatory tactics. 109 To avoid
the adverse selection problem created by these restrictions, the PPACA requires
individual mandates.'o These mandates would entice lower-risk individuals to
enter the pool and balance total risk, even though they are paying the same
premium as individuals with higher risk profiles. "
Within the exchange, an insurer must defend and HHS must approve any
premium increase.112 In an effort to control premiums, the PPACA puts limits on
the MLR.'' 3 Insurers must spend at least eighty percent of net premium dollars
collected on claims from the individual and small business market and eighty-five
percent from the large employer market.114 Insurers must provide enrollees with
rebates for any amount lower than the thresholds." 5 A state may have a higher
threshold or rebate program as long as it does not undercut the federal program. 116
The Secretary will determine the MLR definition with advice from the NAIC. "7
The PPACA provides a structural framework for the exchanges focused on
access to care, fair pricing, and transparency."' The PPACA establishes the
exchanges' fundamental economic base reliant on private market participation;
107. Id § 18031 (d)(6).
108. Id § 18032(c).
109. See generally id. § 300gg-1 to 12 (regulating a variety of coverage limitations).
110. Id § 18091. The individual mandate is a penalty that an individual must pay if he chooses not
to obtain insurance coverage. See I.R.C. § 5000A (outlining the details of the penalty).
111. AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, supra note 91, at 2.
112. 42 U.S.C.S § 300gg-9 4.
113. Id § 300gg-18(b).
114. Id
115. Id § 300gg-18(b)(1).
116. Id. § 300gg-I8(b)(I)(A)(i)-(ii).
117. Id § 300gg-18(c). In October 2010, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC) submitted to the Secretary of U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) a
definition for the medical loss ratio. Letter from the Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs to Kathleen Sebelius,
supra note 70. The medical loss ratio is defined as: (Reimbursement for clinical services plus
expenditures to improve health care quality) divided by (Total premium revenue minus Federal and
State taxes and licensing or regulatory fees). 42 U.S.C.S § 300gg-1 8(b).
118. Sharon Silow-Carroll et al., Health Insurance Exchanges: State Roles In Selecting Health Plans
and Avoiding Adverse Selection, STATES IN ACTION (The Commonwealth Fund, D.C.), Feb.-Mar. 2011,
at I, http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Newsletters/States-in-Action/20 I/Mar/February-March-
2011 /Feature/Feature.aspx (explaining the purpose of an insurance exchange and the goals that federal
reform seeks to attain).
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however, it leaves many details to state regulators.' 19 Individual state decisions will
determine whether the private market finds it economically justified to participate,
thus determining the success of the PPACA as a whole.
IV. BUSINESS IMPLICATIONS AND PRIVATE INSURERS' ROLES IN THE EXCHANGE
The overarching objectives in regulating the private insurance market are to
ensure fairness and reasonableness, protect insurer solvency, avoid excessive
insurer profits and provide fair, adequate and clear options for American citizens.120
In order for the exchange marketplaces to be successful, each must offer consumer
choice and private insurers must be willing to participate in the marketplace.121 As
such, federal regulations must be effectively comingled with state insurance
legislation. As individual states begin to implement the general regulations of the
the PPACA, legislators must ensure that new state statutes work in concert with the
federal statutes.
Further, state insurance regulators and the exchange operators must view the
transition with an economic and business perspective.122 Though the PPACA
provides the groundwork, it will ultimately be up to the states to make these
marketplaces successful. Federal regulations and state legislation and policies must
strike the appropriate balance between reform objectives and political policy,
particularly through risk selection, premium rating and premium adjustment.
A. Risk Selection
As previously explained, in order to establish economically fair prices for
taking on health risk in the private individual market, insurers use risk
classification.123 The PPACA seeks to increase access to care by creating mandated
risk pools within the exchanges that will eliminate risk selection.124 These pools,
however, can fall subject to adverse selection.125 The PPACA encourages insurer
participation in the exchanges by addressing adverse selection through an
individual mandate.126 For the individual mandate to be successful, there must be
public support or another alternative should be considered.
119. Id.
120. Kingsdale & Bertko, supra note 50, at 1159 (explaining how an exchange should "be organized
and governed").
121. Id. at 1161.
122. Id. at 1162.
123. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text; COMM. ON RISK CLASSIFICATION, AM. ACAD.
OF ACTUARIES, RISK CLASSIFICATION STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 5, available at
http://www.actuarialstandardsboard.org/pdf/riskclassificationSOP.pdf (last visited March 13, 2012).
124. Silow-Carroll et al., supra note 118, at 1.
125. Id. at 2.
126. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 5000A, 42 U.S.C.S. § 18091 (LexisNexis
Supp. 2011) (requiring individuals to purchase health insurance or pay a penalty). In order for private
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When an insurer creates risk pools, it considers factors such as past
experience and future trends for groups with similar risk characteristics.127 These
factors determine averages and averages are applied to individuals within the group
to establish pricing and coverage availability to the public.12 In the individual and
small group markets, one of the biggest challenges insurers face during risk
classification is to avoid adverse selection in their risk pools. 129 When healthy
people notice this premium rising to a level they no longer feel is worth paying,
they will exit the pool, leaving the insurer with a single pool of high risk, high cost
individuals.130 Insurers typically respond to this situation through medical
underwriting, lifetime limits, cancellation, and rescission. 13i
By setting up the exchanges, the PPACA seeks to eliminate current risk
classification and pooling by creating a small number of structured risk pools.132
The PPACA addresses the adverse selection problem inherent within these pools
with an individual mandate.'33 The mandate is a legal requirement that an
individual purchase an approved healthcare policy or pay a fee.134 In theory, the
mandate should be enough incentive to keep individuals within the exchange
market and avoid disrupting the balanced risk pool within the exchange.' 35 Some
critics fear that the penalty for not complying with the mandate is not large
enough,136 and others that enforcement is not strict enough.'3 7
The largest controversy, however, is the mandate's constitutionality.' 38 The
main question concerning the individual mandate is whether the Constitution
allows Congress to enact legislation that requires individuals to purchase a product
insurers to participate in the exchanges, adverse selection must be controlled through the individual
mandate. AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, supra note 91, at 1.
127. A PRIMER 2008 UPDATE, supra note 23, at 5-6.
128. Id. at 5 (explaining that insurers create risk pools compiled of people from different segments of
the population but vary premiums based on a variety of factors and their averages).
129. Brennan & Studdert, supra note 64, at 147-48.
130. Id. at 1148.
13 1. Id.
132. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1312, 42 U.S.C. § 18032(c) (Supp. 2011)
(outlining the risk pools in the individual and small group markets).
133. Id § 18091.
134. I.R.C. § 5000A.
135. See Brennan & Studdert, supra note 64, at 1148 (determining that risk pools are inevitably
uneven without a mandate requiring individuals to remain in the pools, but that insurers fear that the
mandate in the PPACA may not be adequate to ensure compliance).
136. Id.
137. Mark Merlis, Individual Mandate, HEALTH POL'Y BRIEF (Health Affairs, Bethesda, MD), Jan.
13, 2010, at 6.
138. See Richard Cauchi, State Legislation and Actions Challenging Certain Health Reforms, 2011-
2012, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Feb. 20, 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-
research/health/state-laws-and-actions-challenging-PPACA.aspx (giving detailed accounts of current
legislation and actions that challenge various aspects of health reforms, including the individual
mandate).
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from the private market.'39 Those who support the legislation use Congress's
Taxing Power, the Commerce Clause, and the Necessary and Proper Clause as
support for Congressional power to pass the PPACA and implement the individual
mandate.140 Opponents argue, however that the mandate is a penalty and not a
tax,141 Congress can not compel economic activities in order to regulate them,142
and that the mandate is unnecessary because it addresses a problem created by the
PPACA.143 Lawsuits have been decided in five state lower courts, with three
holding the PPACA constitutional and two holding the PPACA unconstitutional.'"
Appellate courts have also addressed challenges to PPACA in the summer of 2011.
The Sixth Circuit Federal Court of Appeals upheld the law in its entirety in June145
while, in August, the Eleventh Circuit Federal Court of Appeals was the first
federal appellate court to rule the mandate unconstitutional.146 In its action against
the PPACA, the state of Virginia attempted to bypass the Fourth Circuit and made a
motion to the Supreme Court for expedited review.147 The Supreme Court denied
the request.148
139. ROBERT A. LEVY, CATO INST., THE CASE AGAINST PRESIDENT OBAMA'S HEALTH CARE
REFORM: A PRIMER FOR NONLAWYERS 3 (2011).
140. Id
141. Id. at 8.
142. Id at 6-7.
143. Id. at 10.
144. See Florida v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 780 F.Supp. 2d 1307, 1316 (N.D. Fla.
2011) (holding the individual mandate unconstitutional and not severable from the rest of the Act);
Mead v. Holder, 766 F.Supp. 2d 16, 33, 35 (D.D.C. 2011) (upholding the mandate because decisions to
purchase or not to purchase insurance are economical ones within the purview of Congress' Commerce
Clause), aff'd sub nom. Seven-Sky v. Holder, No. 11-5047, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 22566 (D.C. Cir.
Nov. 8, 2011); Virginia Commonwealth ex rel. Cuccinell v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 788 (E.D.
Va. 2010) (striking down the individual mandate as exceeding Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause), vacated, 656 F.3d 253, 272-273, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18632, *28 (4"' Cir. Sept. 8, 2011)
(holding that the Virginia Commonwealth lacked standing to bring suit challenging the mandate's
constitutionality and refusing to analyze the merits of the Commerce Clause challenge); Liberty Univ.,
Inc. v. Geither et al., 753 F. Supp. 2d 611, 635 (W.D. Va. 2010) (upholding the law based on the
Commerce Clause), vacated, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18618 (4t' Cir. Sept. 8, 2011) (remanding the case
back to District Court to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Thomas More Law Ctr. v.
Obama, 720 F.Supp. 2d 882, 895 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (upholding the law as a valid exercise of the
Commerce Clause), affd, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. July 26, 2011) (No.
11-117).
145. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 549 (6th Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed,
(U.S. July 26, 2011) (No. 11- 117).
146. Florida v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Serys., 648 F.3d 1235, 1328 (1Ith Cir. 2011), cert
granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011). For an analysis of the Eleventh Circuit opinion, see Timothy Jost,
Appellate Court: Individual Mandate Falls but Rest of Affordable Care Act Survives, HEALTH AFF.
BLOG (Aug. 15, 2011), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2011/08/15/appellate-court-individual-mandate-
falls-but-rest-of-affordable-care-act-survives/.
147. Petition for Writ Of Certiorari at 36-37, Commonwealth ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F.
Supp. 2d 598 (E.D. Va. 2011).
148. Commonwealth ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598 (2011), cert denied, 131 S.
Ct. 2152.
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Because the individual mandate is the crucible to the PPACA's success, some
members of Congress began considering alternatives.149 Most alternatives focus on
individual responsibility without imposing a direct financial requirement on an
individual' 50 Even the Government Accountability Office performed a study that
interviewed forty-one experts from twenty-one organizations that are healthcare
stakeholders or researchers.' 5' The report came up with nine possible alternatives to
the individual mandate should the Supreme Court overturn the requirement. These
alternatives include to:
modify open enrollment periods and imposing penalties for late
enrollment; expand employers' roles in autoenrolling and
facilitating employees' health insurance enrollment; conduct a
public education and outreach campaign; provide broad access to
personalized assistance for health coverage enrollment; impose a tax
to pay for uncompensated care; allow greater variation in premium
rates based on enrollee age; condition the receipt of certain
government services upon proof of health insurance coverage; use
health insurance agents and brokers differently; require or
encourage credit rating agencies to use health insurance status as a
factor in determining credit ratings. 152
None of these alternatives on their own, though, will effectively address
adverse selection.
Ultimately, premium rates drive adverse selection so any alternative to the
mandate must limit adverse selection. 13 As premium rates rise, those who feel it
unnecessary to pay those rates will exit the market and take their chances. 154
Premium rates themselves are largely driven by medical expenses. 55 The impetus
for an individual to remain in the market must be high enough that he will be
willing to purchase insurance instead of face the consequences of non-
149. Experts, Legislators Ml Alternative Ideas on Individual Mandate, CALIFORNIA HEALTHLINE
(Feb. 7, 2011), http://www.califomiahealthline.org/articles/2011/2/7/experts-legislators-mull-alternative-
ideas-on-individual-mandate.aspx.
150. See id. (outlining various congressional proposals). Representative Peter DeFazio (D-Ore.)
suggested individuals be able to "opt out of the mandate" and sign an "'affidavit of personal
responsibility' for their own health care costs" and not allow health care debt forgiveness during
bankruptcy. Id. Senators Claire McCaskill (D-Mo.) and Ben Nelson (D-Neb.) suggest providing
"financial incentives to individuals who purchase insurance during the open-enrollment periods." Id
151. Letter from John E. Dicken, Dir. Health Care, U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, to E. Benjamin
Nelson, Chairman, Subcomm. on the Legislative Branch, Comm. on Appropriates, U.S. Senate (Feb. 25
2011).
152. Id.
153. AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, supra note 91, at 2 (explaining that when regulations such as rating
rules impact adverse selection, they also impact premiums and incentives for individuals to participate in
health insurance plans, beyond just the mandate, limit adverse selection).
154. Id at 1.
155. Kisken, supra note 77.
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participation.' 56 Options such as public outreach and education, enrollment period
monitoring, and more assistance with enrollment, will not be enough incentive for
an individual to continue to buy insurance.' 57  Allowing broader premium
fluctuations with age may be enough incentive for young people to enter, but then
the risk pools face being unbalanced and insurers arrive at the same high cost pools
they had before the exchanges.'58 The only sustainable option would be a tax,
which mirrors the mandate.' 59 The "correct" individual mandate will be enough
incentive for a young healthy person to pay for basic health plan rather than pay the
penalty.160
States should work with private insurers to increase public awareness, apply
strict enforcement, and encourage trust in the state exchanges so as to persuade
young, healthy individuals to participate in the exchanges or risk insurers' mass
exit from the individual market. The individual mandate's amount must be in line
with the cost of the cheapest insurance plan.'6' If there is too much of a gap
between the amounts, healthy, low-risk individuals may feel financially better off
simply paying the mandate and opting out of insurance.162 Though it would be
unwise to enforce mandate payments through direct criminal statutes, it will be
important that state governments enforce the individual mandate penalties strictly
156. See Vanessa Fuhrmans, Mandated Health Insurance Squeezes Those in the Middle, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 15, 2009, at Al (reporting about individuals in Massachusetts that choose to forego buying
insurance in the exchange because saving their expected out of pocket medical costs and paying the
penalty for not being insured, saves the individuals money).
157. See AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, supra note 91, at 2 (determining that voluntary incentives will
likely not be as successful as a mandate). Economical incentives will likely drive more people than
social and moral incentives.
158. See Nine Alternatives to Individual Health Insurance Mandate; Will They Work?, INS. J. (Mar.
29, 2011), http://www.insurancejoumal.com/news/national/2011/03/29/192080.htm. If younger,
healthier people are paying lower premiums, the insurer is not collecting enough premium to make up
for the riskier individuals in the pool. Id.
1 59. See Robert Pear, Changing Stance, Administration Now Defends Insurance Mandate as a Tax,
N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2010, at A14 (reporting that the Justice Department has argued that the
requirement for people to carry insurance or pay the penalty is a valid exercise of Congress's power to
impose taxes).
160. See AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, supra note 91, at 2 ("Proposals to implement alternative risk
pooling arrangements need to maximize the enrollment of healthy risks, while not pricing the unhealthy
risks out of the market."). As this paper argues, the individual mandate is economically the most
effective solution to adverse selection in the PPACA Exchanges. What the constitutional controversy
boils down to, then may not be driven by constitutional principles, but one political party disappointed in
the outcomes of health care reform. The party now is attacking the mandate in order to nullify the entire
legislation. Politically, this tactic may prove successful; however economically, the PPACA requires the
mandate to be successful. See A PRIMER 2008 UPDATE., supra note 23, at 5 (describing the consequence
of significant adverse selection within a risk pool as a "death spiral" where as healthy people leave a risk
pool, the average costs within the pool go up, which causes more healthy people to leave the pool, until
the insurer can not afford to cover anyone in the pool).
161. See Fuhrmans, supra note 156 (describing the consequences of people leaving the exchanges if
the penalty costs less than self insuring).
162. Id.
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and fairly to individuals who choose not to obtain insurance. 63 Incorporating the
mandate into the state tax code could relieve some of the administrative burden of
enforcement as well as encourage consistent application.M Though penalties may
bring public backlash, as exhibited by the various lawsuits challenging the
mandate's constitutionality,' 65 the state governments can use public education to
show that participation is in everyone's best interest.
In 2007, Utah established its own limited health exchange for small
businesses. 166 Utilizing a "defined contribution plan", individual employees choose
their own health plans instead of employers selecting the plan options.167 This
approach has potential risk segmentation, however because those in poor health or
with health problems may be more inclined to choose particular plans instead of
others.'68 This adverse selection will eventually drive private insurers out of the
market.169 To address this problem, the health insurers participating in the exchange
agreed to use risk adjustment to apportion the risk of individuals who used the
exchange to purchase a plan. 70 Insurance carriers, business owners, and
government agency representatives sit on the exchange's risk adjustment board.' 7'
Any of the board's decisions must be approved by the insurance commissioner.172
The board works cooperatively to monitor and manage risk within the exchange to
ensure private insurer participation.' 73
Massachusetts has been a forerunner in state health care reform and its
legislature independently established a quasi government agency called the
163. See Timothy Noah, Maybe the Individual Mandate is Enjbrceable, SLATE (last updated Apr. 7,
2010, 6:14 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2250098/ (contemplating that compliance with the mandate
seems voluntary but that the IRS will enforce the mandate uniformly through the tax return process and
if not followed, the IRS could seize tax returns).
I 64. See Jonathan Strong, IRS Looking to Hire Thousands of Tax Agents to Enforce Health Care
Laws, DAILY CALLER (Mar. 22, 2010, 5:35 PM), http://dailycaller.com/2010/03/22/irs-looking-to-hiring-
thousands-of-armed-tax-agents-to-enforce-health-care-laws/ (discussing the federal tax code and the
plan to implement aspects of the PPACA).
165. Id See supra note 144 and accompanying text (describing five different lawsuits questioning
the mandate and PPACA as a whole).
166. John Buntin, A Closer Look: Utah's Health Insurance Exchange, GOVERNING (April 26, 2011),
http://www.goveming.com/topics/health-human-services/closer-look-utah-health-insurance-
exchange.html.
167. Utah Health Exchange, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (Feb.-March 2011),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Newsletters/States-in-Action/201 I /Mar/February-March-
201 1/Snapshots/Utah.aspx.
168. Id.
169. Austin Frakt, Dispatch from Massachusetts: The Individual Mandate is Working, KAISER
HEALTH NEWS (July 22, 2010), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Columns/2010/July/0722 I OFrakt.aspx.
170. Utah Health Exchange, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (Feb.-March 2011),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Newsletters/States-in-Action/20 11/Mar/February-March-
2011 /Snapshots/Utah.aspx.
17 1. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
214 [VOt. 15:197
AMERICAN HEALTH BENEFIT EXCHANGES
Commonwealth Heath Insurance Connector Authority ("The Connector").174 When
Massachusetts created its state exchange in 2006, state officials put significant
effort into public education.175 Massachusetts focused on making purchasing health
insurance more of a social norm.176 They encouraged enrollment at clinics and
through easy online forums and used media and advertising to increase public
awareness.' 77 Massachusetts also incorporated the mandate into its state tax
system. 78 The Connector developed an annual affordability schedule that
determines the maximum monthly premium for individuals and uses this schedule
to determine which plan options are considered affordable.179 Individuals who are
considered able to afford coverage under this schedule, but choose not to attain it
are assessed a tax penalty.s 0 The 2011 tax penalties for adults deemed able to
afford coverage, are "based on half the cost of the lowest priced Commonwealth
Care plan available."' 8' Today, Massachusetts has about ninety-seven percent of its
population insured.182
The federal government's heated defense of the individual mandate and the
many alternatives proposed in case it is stricken, reflect the necessity of private
insurer participation in the individual state exchanges. These insurers will only
participate if they are assured that they can avoid adverse selection within the
exchanges without their current strategies. For the PPACA to be successful in
increasing access to care, the states must support the only effective way of
controlling adverse selection, which is the individual mandate.
B. Premium Rating
Premiums are insurers' main source of revenue and actuaries determine
premiums by incorporating a number of factors into risk and setting premiums
accordingly.183 Because insurers can easily adjust premiums with little regulation,
unbridled rises in premiums can lead to unaffordable care and excessive profits.184
174. AMY M. LISCHKO ET AL., THE MASSACHUSETTS COMMONWEALTH HEALTH INSURANCE
CONNECTOR: STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS 1 (2009), available at
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/-/media/Files/Publications/ssue%20Brief/2009/May/ssue%20OBrie
f.pdf
175. MacGillis, supra note 83, at 90.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. LISCHKO ET AL., supra note 174, at 8.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Find Insurance. Individuals and Families Frequently Asked Questions, HEALTH CONNECTOR,
https://www.mahealthconnector.org/portal/site/connector/menuitem.afc6a36a62ecla50dbef6f47d7468a0
c/?fiShown=default (last visited Jan. 16, 2011).
182. MacGillis, supra note 83, at 90.
183. AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, supra note 91, at 2.
184. See Reed Abelson, Senate Pressing Insurers on the Amount of Premiums They Spend on Care,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2009, at BI (explaining that in 2009 for-profit insurance companies spent as little
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The PPACA attempts to ensure greater access to affordable care through
community ratings and by requiring states to regulate premium changes. 8 s Too
much regulatory pressure to reduce premium pricing, however threatens insurer
solvency.186 In order to promote private insurer participation in state exchanges,
state regulators must acknowledge the financial impact premiums have on business
operations and create political balance in exchange leadership.
Instead of evaluating the risk of an individual buyer, the PPACA requires
insurers to base premiums on community ratings. 87 Proponents argue that utilizing
community ratings will provide greater access to care because high risk individuals
will pay the same premiums as lower risk individuals.' These ratings are set in
advance based on community attributes. 189 There are a few factors that allow very
small adjustments to the premiums, including age, family composition, tobacco
use, and location.190 Additionally, premium rates will be compressed, in that
premiums for adults can only be up to three times as large as those for the young. 91
Proponents also argue that the PPACA brings transparency to premium rate
increases, requiring states to base any increase on "reasonable cost assumptions"
and "solid evidence" and experts will evaluate the increases to ensure the
assumptions are fair. 192 The hope is to provide consumers with access to
information about rate increases and hold insurers accountable for their pricing. 93
as sixty-six cents of each dollar of premiums on doctor and hospital bills and the rest on administrative
expenses, marketing, and profits); HEALTHCARE.GOV, HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUMS: PAST HIGH
COSTS WILL BECOME THE PRESENT AND FUTURE WITHOUT HEALTH REFORM 1 (2011), available at
http://www.healthcare.gov/law/resources/reports/premiums01282011a.pdf (describing the growth of
health insurance premiums and costs from 1999 to 2009 and how these growths severely outpaced wage
growth).
185. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2701, 42 U.S.C.S. 300gg(a) (LexisNexis
Supp. 2011) (establishing community ratings); Fact Sheet: Fighting Unreasonable Health Insurance
Premium Increases, HEALTHCARE.GOV,
http://www.healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/ratereview05l92011a.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2011)
(reporting that on May 19, 2011, HHS issued a final regulation to implement the PPACA requirement
that states evaluate large proposed premium increases and make sure they "are based on reasonable cost
assumptions and solid evidence") [hereinafter Fact Sheet].
186. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text; see also Letter from the Nat'l Ass'n of Ins.
Comm'rs to Kathleen Sebelius, supra note 70 (expressing concern that destabilized insurance markets
may undermine insurer solvency).
187. 42 U.S.C.S. § 300gg(a).
188. See Kingsdale & Bertko, supra note 50, at 1159 (discussing community rating and premium
payments).
189. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 300gg(a)(2) (defining a rating area).
190. Id. § 300gg(a)(1)(A).
191. Id. § 300gg(a)(1)(A)(iii).
I 92. Fact Sheet, supra note 185.
193. Id
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Standardized premiums can pose a problem to the insurer's business model,
however.194 Strict premium regulation threatens not only private insurers' ability to
remain profitable, 9 5 but more critically, the insurers' ability to remain solvent.' 96 If
premiums are regulated too low than what is optimal for an insurer's business
operations, the insurer will not have enough capital to keep operations running
efficiently, which causes insurers to leave the market or even face solvency
problems.'97 An insolvent insurer is unable to pay operation costs and, more
importantly, it can not pay claims.'98 One company's insolvency threatens the
public trust in other companies.'99
If the insurer faces higher costs in the highly regulated individual market
inside the exchange, it will look to make more money in the less regulated
employer-based market outside the exchange. 200 Insurers will raise premium prices
for employer and small business plans outside the exchanges to subsidize the losses
from the individual market within the exchange. 201 Costs are then passed on to
employers. 202 Employers will lower the premium amount they are willing to cover
and pass the cost onto employees, or choose to not provide coverage and pay the
fine imposed by the PPACA for doing so. 203 Thus, consumers in the employer-
194. See BAKER, supra note 90, at 638 (describing the consequences of premiums that are set too
low).
195. LABORDE, supra note 71, at 7. For profit companies must also maintain adequate profits to
please investors and stockholders. THOMAS WHEELEN & J. DAVID HUNGER, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT
AND BUSINESS POLICY: TOWARD GLOBAL SUSTAINABILITY 45 (13th ed. 2012).
196. See BLUECROSS BLUESHIELD OF N. C., IN THE SPOTLIGHT: HEALTH CARE REFORM AND PRE
EXISTING CONDITIONS INSURANCE PLANS 1 (2010) (explaining that "pre-existing condition insurance
plans do not charge 'actuarially justified' premium[s]" so they require additional funding).
197. James C. Capretta & Tom Miller, How to Cover Pre-existing Conditions, NAT'L AFF., Summer
2010, at 110, 115.
198. Policyholder Information, NAT'L ORG. OF LIFE & HEALTH, INS. GUARANTY ASs'NS,
http://www.nolhga.com/policyholderinfo/main.cfm/location/insolvencyprocess (last visited Aug. 24,
2011). Though by state law, health insurers are members of the state's guaranty association that steps in
to cover policies of an insolvent insurer, there are also maximum limits on how much each individual
can receive no matter what his policy contract was. Id.
199. BAKER, supra note 90, at 638.
200. See Larry Levitt & Gary Claxton, Remember the People Outside of the Exchanges, HENRY J.
KAISER FAMILY FOUND. HEALTH REFORM SOURCE (July 22, 2011), http://healthreform.kff.org/notes-
on-health-insurance-and-reform/201 1/july/remember-the-people-outside-of-exchanges.aspx (outlining
that if plans outside exchanges have greater flexibility than those inside the exchanges, plans outside the
exchanges will have pricing advantages and potentially attract healthier enrollees).
201. Troyen Brennan & Thomas Lee, Risk-Shifiing in Health Care and Its Implications: Part Two,
HEALTHAFFAIRS BLOG (Aug. 25, 2011, 1:02 PM), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2011/08/25/risk-shifting-
in-health-care-and-its-implications-part-two/ (explaining the same phenomenon occurring in Medicare
when health care providers face losses on Medicare, they cross subsidize those losses with patients in
other segments of the market that pay more for care).
202. Id.
203. See id. (discussing employer decision making and cross subsidization).
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based market effectively bear the cost of adverse selection.2 04 Because exchanges
need private insurers to remain solvent, there will be significant pressure on the
exchanges to be fair to insurers and consumers. This will require significant
communication and cooperation among the insurance commissioner, the exchange
and insurers as well as public education. 205
In 2011, Maryland's governor signed into law the Maryland Health Benefit
Exchange Act that set up the Maryland Health Benefit Exchange. 206 The Act
creates a Board of Trustees to oversee the exchange. 207 This board consists of the
Secretary of Mental Health and Hygiene, the Commissioner, the Executive Director
of The Maryland Health Care Commission and six members appointed by the
governor.208 These six people will include three who represent the interest of
employers and individual consumers of the products offered by the exchange, and
three members who demonstrate knowledge and expertise in a particularly relevant
area such as health care finance. 209 Additionally, governor appointments must
represent a diversity of expertise, race, gender, and ethnicity and the state's
geographical areas.210 The Board will appoint an Executive Director of the
Exchange who will, among other things, manage the exchange. 211 Maryland's
legislation reflects the legislature's attempt to keep the exchange from overly
political influences. The bill balances interests by including both private insurer
and community representatives to the Board of Trustees. Maryland's legislature
attempts to limit the political influence over the exchange, and to ensure that the six
appointed members of the board remain diversified in order to keep the system
running efficiently.
In contrast to Maryland, Utah is an example of a compromise model for
politically conservative states that want to limit government involvement in the
exchanges. 212 Utah's health insurance exchange is part of the governor's Office of
Economic Development. 213 Utah's governor sought input from the private sector
and in December 2010, appointed a former insurance executive as the director of
204. See id. (explaining that if insurers begin to drop coverage because it is unaffordable, those in
the individual segment "will bear the brunt" of insurer cross subsidization).
205. Id. (addressing the risk shifting that exchanges will cause to the health care system and the
implications the shifting will have on and among the different parties within the system).
206. H.D. 166, S. 182, 2011 Leg., 428th Sess. (Md. 2011) (codified at MD. CODE ANN. INS. § 31-
104(a) (LexisNexis 2011)).
207. MD. CODE ANN. INS. § 31-104(a) (LexisNexis 2011).
208. Id § 31-104(b).
209. Id § 31-104(b)(4).
210. Id. §31-104(c).
211. Id. §31-105(a)(1).
212. See Buntin, supra note 166 (describing an interview with the communications director of the
Utah Office of Economic Development that suggests that Utah's Exchange had limited government
requirements and restrictions, but rather government partnership gave small businesses an opportunity to
develop a new model of insurance coverage).
213. Id.
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Utah's health exchange. 214 The health exchange runs on a budget of only $600,000
and a two person staff.2 15 Utilizing the "contribution market" 216 approach, Utah
seeks to provide the information platform for individual consumers to make
informed decisions on health care purchases. 217 Initially, Utah allowed premiums
for plans outside the exchanges to be different from premiums for plans inside the
exchanges. 218 In March 2010, however the Utah legislature passed a statute
requiring health carriers to charge the same rates for the same products, whether
inside or outside the exchanges, in order to standardize rating practices in the
small-group market. 219 Premiums may be adjusted for limiting factors such age,
family composition and geographic area.220 Utah combines a conservative market
approach with limited government intervention and premium regulation to expand
healthcare access for its citizens. 221
Because premiums not only drive insurers' profitability, but their ability to
adjust risk in order to remain solvent and operable, 222 it is imperative that as states
set premium values, states consider the business implications such values will have
and balance political influence over premium regulation. Today, only twenty-five
states have a structure in place that regulates health insurance premiums
spending. 223 The PPACA prohibits "unreasonable" premium increases but leaves
defining "unreasonable" to the states. 224 Much like Massachusetts, individual states
must balance regulatory roles between the state's insurance commissioner and the
214. Id
215. Id.
216. Id. Through the Utah Health Exchange, "small businesses can make a defined contribution- a
fixed dollar amount per employee-toward health insurance, and their employees can compare and
select health plans . . . ." Utah Health Exchange, supra note 170, at 1. Employees pay the portion of the
premium that the employer's fixed amount does not cover. Id. This system gives consumers more
choices, employers more control over costs, and keeps the private industry actively involved in the
health insurance market. Id.
217. Utah Health Exchange, supra note 170, at I (describing consumers' ability to view "side-by-
side comparisons of health plans" and filter and sort the results).
2 18. Id.
219. Id.
220. Sabrina Corlette, Debunking the Mythology: The Utah and Massachusetts Health Exchanges,
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Apr. 6, 2011),
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Columns/2011/April/040611 corlette.aspx.
221. Gregg Girvan, Consumer Power: Five Lessons from Utah's Health Care Reform,
BACKGROUNDER, Aug. 19, 2010, at 1, 2 (describing Utah's reforms that allow small business employees
to purchase insurance through the exchange with little cost to the state and concluding that Utah's
reforms will decrease health care costs while mandates and restrictions will increase insurance costs for
citizens).
222. See supra notes 200-04 and accompanying text (discussing premium effect on profitability and
operability).
223. Nichols, supra note 67, at 1153.
224. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2794, 42 U.S.C.S. § 300gg-94(a)(2) (LexisNexis
Supp. 2011).
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executive in charge of running the exchanges. 225 By maintaining this balance,
premium regulation can be structured with input from the commissioner, the
consumers, and insurers. Regulators must also consider that if premium rates are
set too low or if mandates prove unable to control the structured risk pool and result
in adverse selection, insurers will face higher costs. 226 This will drive insurers to
cross-subsidize their costs in order to remain profitable, or even solvent. 227
C. Premium Adjustment/Medical Loss Ratio
When insurers collect premiums from consumers, a portion is spent on
medical claims and related expenses and the rest of the funds are spent on
administrative expenses such as marketing costs and profits. 22 8 The MLR is an
important financial tool because it can reflect how efficiently an insurer spends its
premium dollars; or how much value the consumer receives per premium dollar
paid.229 The PPACA regulates insurers' MLRs to provide more "value" per
consumer premium dollar spent. 230 Overly strict regulation, however will actually
promote inefficiency and drive private insurers out of the exchanges. 231 HHS must
consider market stabilization and allow states leniency in establishing and
maintaining their MLRs.
The PPACA tasks the Secretary of HHS and NAIC with creating a uniform
definition and standardized methodology for calculating the medical loss ratio. 232
The PPACA requires that beginning in 2011, insurers must maintain medical loss
ratios at eighty percent for small business and individual insurers and eighty-five
225. See LISCHKO ET AL., supra note 174, at 2 (describing the various type of people involved in the
Connector and their backgrounds).
226. See Capretta & Miller, supra note 197, at 115 (discussing unbalanced risk pools and adverse
selection).
227. Brennan & Studdert, supra note 64, at 1149. Through cross subsidization, insurers will raise
premiums on employer based plans and plans outside the exchanges in order to pass the cost on to the
consumer. Id.
228. Haberkom, supra note 74, at 1.
229. Robinson, supra note 72, at 176-77. A 2010 study performed by HealthScape Advisors, LLC
determined that the average MLR for small group plans was 83.08 percent and the average MLR for
individual plans was 80.24 percent. Sara Hansard, Insurance Regulation: 2010 Data Show Small Group,
Individual Health Plans Would Have to Make Rebates, BLOOMBERG BUREAU OF NAT'L AFF. (May 4,
2011), http://news.bna.com/hpln/HPLNWB/split display.adp?fedfid=20840354&vname=
macnotallissues&wsn=498259000&searchid=16769407&doctypeid=1&type=date&mode=doc&split-0
&scm=HPLNWB&pg-0.
230. See Getting Your Money's Worth, supra note 72 (describing the ways in which the law will help
ensure "Americans receive value for their premium dollar").
231. Press Release, Indep. Ins. Agents & Brokers of Am., Big "I" Disappointed with HHS
Regulations on MLRS (Nov. 22, 2010), (describing the Independent Insurance Agents & Brokers of
America's concern that the PPACA's MLR regulation will have a "devastating effect on the private
marketplace" and that "consumers will be negatively impacted").
232. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2718, 42 U.S.C.S. § 300gg-18(c) (LexisNexis
Supp. 2011).
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percent for large businesses. 233 Insurers must report their expenditures annually and
if they do not meet the eighty percent or eighty-five percent standard, they must
provide consumers a rebate for the difference. 234 The Secretary has authority to
initially waive the MLR requirement if an individual state can prove that the eighty
percent MLR will cause market destabilization. 235
After considering input from current state regulators, insurance industry
experts, and others experienced in insurance provisions, on October 21, 2010,
NAIC submitted MLR recommendations to the Secretary. 236 A significant portion
of the recommended regulations focus on defining what expenses may be included
in health quality improvement (QI) because those expenses will not be included in
the twenty percent limited administrative expenses. 237 The recommendation focuses
on expenses that are "capable of being objectively measured and of producing
verifiable results and achievements"; they must be "grounded in evidence-based
medicine"; "widely accepted best clinical practice; or criteria issued by recognized
professional medical societies, accreditation bodies, government agencies, or other
nationally recognized health care quality organizations." 238 The QI activities must
be "directed toward individual enrollees or may be incurred for the benefit of a
special segment of enrollees." 239 The focus of this definition is transparency, clear
accountability, and creating the most "value" for consumers' premium expense. 240
While the PPACA's definition of value, applied specifically though HHS,
appears consistent on its face, it presents two major issues: it may not actually
provide value to consumers and it may promote financial inefficiency.
Supporters of the regulation argue that the stringent requirement will force
insurers to be economically more efficient.241 For those insurers that choose to
participate in the exchanges, many functions have potential to be streamlined,
233. Id. § 300gg-18(b)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).
234. Id. § 300gg-18(b)(1)(A)-(B). For example, if an individual/small business insurer collects
$1,000,000 in annual premiums, it must spend $800,000 on medical claims and $200,000 on
administrative expenses. If the insurer spends only $700,000 on medical claims, it must rebate the
$100,000 to all qualified consumers.
235. Id. § 300gg-18(b)(1)(A)(ii).
236. Letter from the Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs to Kathleen Sebelius, supra note 70.
237. See NAT'L ASS'N OF INS COMM'RS, REGULATION FOR UNIFORM DEFINITIONS AND
STANDARDIZED METHODOLOGIES FOR CALCULATION OF THE MEDICAL Loss RATIO FOR PLAN YEARS
2011, 2012 AND 2013 PER SECTION 2718(b) OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE ACT 190-34 to 39 (2010),
available at http://www.naic.org/documents/committees ex mlr reg asadopted.pdf; Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act § 2718,42 U.S.C.S. § 300gg-18(b).
238. NAT'L ASs'N OF INS COMM'RS, supra note 237 at 190-34.
239. Id.
240. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2718, 42 U.S.C.S. § 300gg-18(a)-b). In
December 2011, the Secretary issued a final interim rule effective January 3, 2012 defining the MLR
requirements. 45 C.F.R. § 158.150 (2011) (defining "[a]ctivities that improve health care quality").
241. See Getting Your Money's Worth, supra note 72 (outlining various ways the new MLR rules
will ensure value for consumers).
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including "sales, enrollment, premium billing, collections." 242 The exchanges are
supposed to standardize and automate these processes with the ultimate goal of
reducing administrative costs. 2 43 Opponents argue, however that the rebate
requirement will increase insurer administrative costs, potentially driving up
premiums. 244 Insurers generally do not keep the type of detailed information about
premium payments that a rebate to individual consumers requires.2 45 Additionally,
employers also do not typically track the type of details insurers will require from
employee sponsored plans. 246 These additional responsibilities will likely require
businesses and insurers to add staff and IT systems to manage data requirements,
driving up costs that will ultimately be borne by the consumer.2 47 A 2010 study by
the Health Insurance Report found that "twenty-seven percent of small group health
insurance plans and forty-six percent of individual plans surveyed would have
potential exposure to rebates" in 2012.248
Supporters of the PPACA also argue that the regulation provides transparency
to premium spending. 249 Insurers will provide consumers with information about
how their premiums are spent and how much goes towards medical care and health
improvement care.250 A stringent MLR definition and ratio will ensure that
consumers receive the most value for their premium dollars. 25' There is potential,
however for an impractical definition to create inefficiencies for the private
insurer. 252 For instance, an insurer that collects $1,000,000 in annual premiums,
medical claims payments, and QI expenses must reach at least $800,000. This
leaves the insurer with $200,000 to be dispersed among all administrative expenses.
If the same insurer were to invest $50,000 in a program that significantly reduced
242. Kingsdale & Bertko, supra note 50, at 1161.
243. For example, the Massachusetts Health Connector operates with an administrative budget of
three percent of total premiums. Martin Sipkoff, Making Sense of the Reform Law s Insurance Pools &
Exchanges, MANAGED CARE (June 2010),
http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/1006/1006.exchanges.html (describing the Massachusetts
Health Connector exchange operating with an administrative budget of only three percent of total
premiums compared to private insurers with administrative budgets of five percent to twenty percent of
premiums).
244. Letter from Steven B. Kelmar, Aetna Senior Vice President, Gov't Affairs & Public Policy to
U.S. Dep't Health & Human Servs. 1 (Jan. 31, 2011).
245. Id. at 2.
246. Id. (describing the burden and expense that insurers will be required to bear from tracking
information).
247. Id. at 3-4.
248. Hansard, supra note 229.
249. Getting Your Money s Worth, supra note 72.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. See generally Letter from Steven B. Kelmar, to U.S. Dep't Health & Human Servs., supra note
244 (commenting on various issues regarding how HHS's Interim Final Rule implements MLR
requirements and outlining eight general areas where the Interim Final Rule created inefficiencies and
difficulties for the private insurer business model).
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insurance fraud and abuse (currently not included in the QI definition), that reduced
medical claims payments by $200,000, the insurer would now have a MLR of only
sixty percent which would require a rebate of $200,000 to consumers for a total
$250,000 expense. In order for this to make financial sense to the insurer,
premiums would have to rise to $1,200,000, but the PPACA makes it very difficult
for insurers to raise premiums. 253 Instead, the insurer would choose not to invest in
such a fraud and abuse program because the insurer would lose money.254 This
scenario does not provide value to either the consumer, who would face higher
premiums, or the insurer, who would bear losses for investing in fraud prevention.
Further, if the MLR is set at too high a level compared to the economically
"correct," efficient operation that a private insurance company requires, then
companies will choose to cut salaries and operation systems. 255 An insurer may
choose to hire cheaper, less experienced staff, which may lead to mistakes, slower
payments, or less customer service. As a result, an improperly set MLR would not
encourage efficiency, but cause waste.
Another example of potential inefficiency caused by MLR regulation is found
in Medicare. Proponents of a strict MLR point to Medicare which has not had an
MLR lower than ninety-seven percent between 1993 to 2007.256 Medicare however
is not comparable to the private insurer.257 Medicare has few administrative costs2 58
and because it is funded by the federal government, it does not have to worry about
profit margins and revenues. 259 Though Medicare purports to maximize efficiency
by paying so much for medical claims and expenses, Medicare has historically been
plagued by fraud and abuse.260 Blindly paying properly coded claims may lead to a
253. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2794, 42 U.S.C.S. § 300gg-94(a)(2) (LexisNexis
Supp. 2011).
254. Letter from Steven B. Kelmar, to U.S. Dep't Health & Human Servs., supra note 244, at I
(noting Aetna's concern that the final MLR formula penalizes insurers who invest in quality control
programs such as fraud prevention).
255. See id. 3-4 (describing the tremendous administrative expenses that will be necessary if the
MLR requires stringent reporting requirements and rebates).
256. Wendell Potter, The Insurance Industry 's Lethal Bottom Line - and a Solution from Sens.
Franken and Rockefeller, CTR. FOR MEDIA & DEMOCRACY'S PR WATCH (Dec. 10, 2009, 8:36 AM),
http://www.prwatch.org/node/8747.
257. Medicare is run by the federal government and financed by a payroll tax paid by workers and
employers and also through premiums deducted from social security checks. Soc. SEC. ADMIN,
MEDICARE 4 (2011), available at http://ssa.gov/pubs/10043.pdf. In contrast, private insurance companies
are concerned with returning a profit to investors. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
258. Robert A. Book, Medicare Administrative Costs are Higher, Not Lower, Than for Private
Insurance, HERITAGE FOUND. (June 25, 2009),
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/06/medicare-administrative-costs-are-higher-not-lower-
than-for-private-insurance.
259. See generally supra note 257 and accompanying text (describing the basics of how Medicare
operates).
260. See, e.g., Bill Singer, The Epidemic of Florida Medicare Fraud, FORBES (Aug. 24, 2011, 9:40
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/billsinger/2011/08/24/the-epidemic-of-florida-medicare-fraud/
(reporting that "[o]n February 10, 2011, federal prosecutors indicted 21 Miami-area residents . . . in
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high MLR, but does not necessarily translate to an efficient system.
Comprehensively monitoring for fraud is an additional expense that would require
significant funding that would alter the MLR number.261 There is a delicate balance
in the definition of efficiency and how it is structurally defined through MLR
regulation.
In its letter to the Secretary of HHS that accompanied its regulation
suggestions, the NAIC reiterated its continued concerns about the potential
consequences of the MLR.262 The NAIC points out that consumers will not benefit
from the MLR if the number destabilizes insurance markets where consumer choice
is limited and insurer solvency is destabilized. 263 President and CEO of the
Independent Insurance Agents & Brokers of America (the Big "I"), Robert
Rusbuldt, responded to the proposed regulation with concerns that the rule will lead
to, "severe market disruption, especially in the individual and small group
markets." 264 Charles E. Symington Jr., vice president for government affairs at the
Big "I" voiced similar concerns in a press release, "the MLR provision of the new
health care reform law will have a devastating effect on the private marketplace and
consumers will be negatively impacted."265
Though the legislation will allow individual state markets to make
adjustments to the MLR if it threatens market destabilization, 2 66 the adjustments
may not be enough incentive for insurers to continue participating in the individual
market. States must also get the Secretary's approval to have an adjusted MLR.2 67
Currently, seventeen states have sought permission to adjust the MLR requirement
and only seven have been granted permission. 268 Alternatively, in early 2011,
California's newly appointed Insurance Commissioner, Dave Jones proposed a plan
connection with their alleged participation in a $25 million home helath care Medicare fraud scheme").
In 2010, Medicare paid fifty billion dollars in claims that did not meet program requirements. Jill
Wechsler, Insurers Want MLR Policies to Include Anti-Fraud Efforts, MANAGED HEALTH CARE EXEC.
(Apr. I, 2011), http://managedhealthcareexecutive.modemmedicine.com/mhe/article/
articleDetail.jspid=714733&sk=&date=&pagelD=2.
261. While Medicare has a Health Care Fraud Prevention and Enforcement Team in place, the price
tag for fraud prevention is huge. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Fed. Gov't
Expands Grassroots Fraud Prevention Efforts (Oct. 1, 2010) (announcing nine million dollars in grants
awarded to consumer activist groups to help detect and prevent fraud) (emphasis added).
262. Letter from the Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs to Kathleen Sebelius, supra note 70.
263. Id
264. Press Release, Indep. Ins. Agents & Brokers of Am., supra note 231.
265. Id.
266. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2718, 42 U.S.C.S. § 300gg-18(b)(1)(A)(ii)
(LexisNexis Supp. 2011) (allowing adjustments with approval).
267. See id. (allowing a state to lower the MLR percentage, but only if the Secretary determines that
the twenty-five percent rate will be disruptive to th individual state's market).
268. Medical Loss Ratio Adjustments 2011, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp?ind=940&cat=17 (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).
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to begin enforcing the federal MLR.269 California's existing laws require individual
insurers to maintain a seventy percent MLR. 270 Jones plans to raise this bar to the
eighty percent federal level as soon as possible, so that the state is ready when the
exchanges must be completed in 2014.271 Immediate state implementation may run
into a problem, though because states that currently regulate the MLR do not have a
consistent definition, nor are their definitions the same as the federal definition.
Changing the required state rate under the state definition, may not avoid the
market disruption that insurers fear from federal regulation.
To avoid market disruption and maintain insurer participation, State
commissioners must be extremely cognizant of individual insurer's financial state
and be willing to be flexible with particular allowable expenses. 272 On the federal
level, the Secretary must be willing to allow any state to alter the MLR
requirement. States are using resources and insurance professionals to evaluate
their markets. 273 It is imperative that the Secretary, HHS and the NAIC work with
states when setting the MLR ratio and that states' definition to balance the
overarching goals of value and transparency with the private insurers' business
definition of value and goal of solvency and fairness.
V. CONCLUSION
The PPACA's goal is to reform the health care delivery and insurance system
so that as many Americans as possible have access to affordable health insurance
and appropriate health care services. The PPACA contemplates that primarily, the
private insurance market will provide enhanced access and mandates that the
exchanges provide consumers with transparency, choice, and fair pricing. While the
PPACA lays the groundwork for the exchanges, state regulators are tasked with the
true challenge of building and operating them successfully. 274 In order to do this, it
269. Jones Proposes Plan to Enforce Medical-Loss Ratio Regulations, CAL. HEALTH ONLINE (Jan.
4, 2011), http://www.californiahealthline.org/articles/2011/i/4/j ones-proposes-plan-to-enforce-
medicalloss-ratio-regulations.aspx.
270. Id.
27 1. Id.
272. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2718, 42 U.S.C.S. § 300gg-18(b)(1)(A)(ii)
(LexisNexis Supp. 2011) (addressing the possibility that regulation may cause state market disruption).
For instance, another concern that the private industry has with the suggested regulation is that
brokerage fees are included in administrative expenses. Letter from the Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs to
Kathleen Sebelius, supra note 70. If disallowing these fees in the allowable expenses causes market
disruption, regulators need to address the problem.
273. See, e.g., State Roundup: Fla. Seeks MLR Waiver; Hospitals Struggle, KAISER HEALTH NEWS
(Mar. 15, 2011), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/daily-reports/201 1/march/I 5/states-health-care.aspx
(reporting that as of March 15, 2011, five states had filed petitions asking for an adjustment for federal
medical loss rules for the individual insurance market); see Medical Loss Ratio Adjustments, supra note
268 (providing an up-to-date chart of individual state requests for MLR adjustments, the results, and
other detailed information).
274. 42 U.S.C.S. § 18041.
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is imperative that state regulators approach this task with a business perspective
and develop a balanced structure that not only complies with the PPACA's
mandates, but also encourages private market participation.
